The post-election political landscape has entered a delicate new phase after voters endorsed the first step towards constitutional change in a referendum held alongside the Feb 8 general election — a victory claimed by the People’s Party.
Yet while the result -- 19.8 million votes in favour of change, 10 million against and 2.9 million abstentions -- gives the PP symbolic momentum, the arithmetic in parliament suggests the real battle over the country's supreme law is only beginning.
The Feb 8 polls produced two parallel mandates. A majority of voters signalled support for initiating constitutional reform, while the election delivered a decisive parliamentary advantage to the Bhumjaithai Party (BJT), which emerged with 193 seats -- the largest bloc in the House.
The dual outcome creates a complex power dynamic. The PP can claim public backing for reform in principle, while BJT holds the legislative strength to shape -- and potentially limit -- what that reform ultimately looks like, according to an observer.
Approval of the first step towards constitutional amendment does not amount to a blank cheque for sweeping change. The referendum merely opens the door to deciding the drafting method and procedural pathway.
Key questions remain. Should a fully elected charter drafting assembly (CDA) be created? Should members be partly appointed? And how extensive should revisions be?
The PP has long advocated a comprehensive rewrite of the charter, arguing that structural provisions -- particularly those governing the Senate's powers and the selection of the prime minister -- distort democratic representation. Its platform calls for an elected CDA to ensure legitimacy and broad participation.
Turning that vision into law, however, requires parliamentary approval at several stages. Amendment bills face high thresholds and often require support from both the House and the Senate. Even with referendum momentum, the legislative path remains complex and open to negotiation.
With 193 MPs, BJT wields formidable influence. The party will help shape the parliamentary agenda, from committee composition and debate timetables to legislation required to establish a CDA.
BJT's stance on reform, as articulated by party leader Anutin Charnvirakul, has traditionally been more cautious than that of the PP. While not opposed to amendments, it tends to frame reform in terms of stability and incremental adjustment rather than wholesale redesign.
This difference in philosophy could shape negotiations over the CDA's structure. BJT may favour a mixed model combining elected representatives with appointed experts to avoid excessive politicisation. It may also push to limit revisions to specific chapters rather than reopening the entire charter.
Given its parliamentary strength, BJT could press for such conditions in exchange for cooperation. In effect, it holds considerable leverage over how far and how quickly reform proceeds.
The broader coalition landscape will complicate matters further. Smaller parties may seek concessions in return for supporting amendment bills, whether protections for electoral systems that favour medium-sized parties or resistance to changes seen as weakening existing checks and balances.
If BJT leads the next government, as widely expected, it will likely prioritise coalition stability. That could temper any appetite for radical constitutional experimentation. Conversely, if the PP remains outside government but retains strong public backing, it may seek to mobilise public opinion to pressure parliament.
The tension between public mandate and parliamentary arithmetic has long defined Thai politics. Reformist parties often win the narrative battle only to confront institutional constraints once legislation begins.
Even if the House passes amendment bills, the Senate remains a crucial gatekeeper. Depending on the procedural route, senators could retain decisive influence over whether proposals advance. Their stance on establishing a fully elected CDA will therefore be pivotal.
BJT's strategy in dealing with the Senate may determine whether the process advances or stalls. A confrontational approach risks institutional deadlock, while a negotiated path could dilute reform ambitions, the observer said.
Beyond procedure lies the question of substance. The PP has signalled interest in revisiting provisions concerning the selection of the prime minister, the powers and composition of the Senate, independent oversight bodies and the electoral system.
BJT, by contrast, may prioritise governance efficiency and regional development frameworks, and could resist changes that weaken executive authority or complicate coalition politics.
For the PP, the risk lies in overinterpreting the referendum result as an endorsement of its entire reform agenda. Voters may have supported opening the amendment process without necessarily backing every proposed change.
For BJT, the danger is appearing to obstruct a democratic mandate. If reform stalls or becomes diluted beyond recognition, public frustration could grow. Thailand's political history shows how quickly constitutional disputes can escalate when competing claims of legitimacy collide, the observer said.
The coming months will test whether political actors can pursue constitutional change through negotiation rather than confrontation. Much may depend on whether the PP and BJT can identify areas of overlap -- perhaps agreeing on procedural legitimacy before contesting the substance of reforms.
Compromise could take several forms: a fully elected CDA with defined drafting limits, a phased amendment process addressing less contentious chapters first, or sunset clauses allowing future review.
What is clear is that constitutional reform will not be decided by referendum rhetoric alone. It will unfold through committee deliberations, coalition bargaining and parliamentary votes -- arenas where BJT's 193-seat advantage carries considerable weight.
The Feb 8 vote marked an important symbolic milestone, showing constitutional reform remains a potent issue for voters. But symbolism must now give way to legislative reality.
The PP may have won the opening round by securing approval to begin the amendment process. Yet with BJT controlling the largest bloc in parliament, the shape, scope and pace of reform will depend less on campaign promises than on political negotiation.
Analysts believe Bhumjaithai may be seeking to isolate Thamanat Prompow, Klatham’s chief adviser and its most controversial figure, while instead luring 10 to 20 Klatham MPs to support the coalition government.
Attempting a fine balancing act
Although negotiations to form a government led by the Bhumjaithai Party have yet to be finalised, the coalition leader is said to be thinking beyond simply securing a workable majority, according to political observers.
The way things stand, Bhumjaithai has excluded the Klatham Party from the coalition, with reports suggesting that nine Klatham MPs will support Bhumjaithai leader Anutin Charnvirakul’s prime ministerial bid.
This move has sparked speculation among analysts over whether Bhumjaithai has decided to isolate Thamanat Prompow, Klatham’s chief adviser and its most controversial figure, while instead luring 10 to 20 Klatham MPs — referred to as “green cobras” — to support the government.
The aim is to strengthen the government’s backing in the House without formally bringing Klatham into the cabinet, while also reducing the negotiating power of Pheu Thai, which holds 74 seats and is the only major coalition partner.
According to observers, without additional backing from other parties, Bhumjaithai risks becoming dependent on Pheu Thai — a situation that could leave the party vulnerable should internal conflict arise.
Former prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra, Pheu Thai’s de facto leader, is expected to be released from his one-year jail term soon. Few believe he will step away from politics, and many expect him to continue exerting influence behind the scenes.
Bhumjaithai may also invite the Democrat Party, which has 22 seats, to join the government and reduce Pheu Thai’s bargaining power. While they are modest in number, the Democrats could add weight in terms of image and credibility for the government, according to the observers.
Olarn Thinbangtieo, a political science and law lecturer at Burapha University, said sidelining Thamanat while bringing in some Klatham MPs and the Democrats would be a smart choice.
He noted that the Democrat Party’s three prime ministerial candidates — Abhisit Vejjajiva, Korn Chatikavanij and Karndee Leopairote — possess experience and professional standing that could lend additional credibility to a Bhumjaithai-led government.
If these figures remain in the opposition, their experience may be underused, Mr Olarn said, adding that their inclusion in government could improve public perception while strengthening policy direction and performance.
However, the idea of bringing the Democrats into the coalition is believed to sit uneasily with Bhumjaithai strongman Newin Chidchob, who is reportedly reluctant to appear overly accommodating towards Mr Abhisit, a former prime minister.
According to observers, inviting the Democrats into government would require offering significant posts, possibly including the House Speaker position, which controls parliamentary meetings and oversees proceedings.
Mr Newin reportedly does not favour the House speakership being handed to a party with only 22 MPs.
Instead, he is said to prefer reserving the post for a trusted senior Bhumjaithai figure such as Buri Ram MP Sophon Zarum, who also serves as a deputy prime minister.
While it is acknowledged that Mr Sophon may not match Mr Abhisit’s performance in the House, trust and control appear to be more decisive factors.
Giving the speaker’s post to the Democrats could grant too much influence to a coalition partner.
However, Bhumjaithai is not simply setting its sights on completing a four-year term, but on securing continuity over a longer period to reduce the chances of the People’s Party, the so-called orange camp, expanding its influence, the observers said.
They believe Mr Anutin is highly favoured by the conservative bloc and influential business groups to lead the country for two consecutive terms.
A coalition with minimal internal conflict — and one not dominated by a single partner — would therefore be better positioned to endure.
Mr Anutin needs at least 250 votes in parliament to return as premier, and Bhumjaithai is now close to consolidating 292 seats from several parties.
Under the current formula without the Democrats, Bhumjaithai controls 193 seats, Pheu Thai brings 74, and smaller parties provide the remainder needed for a workable majority, including the Palang Pracharath Party (PPRP) and the New Opportunity Party.
If an additional 10 to 20 MPs from Klatham can be persuaded to support the Bhumjaithai-led government during crucial parliamentary votes, the total number of MPs backing the government could exceed 300.
If Mr Anutin believes incorporating the Democrats would strengthen long-term stability and public acceptance, he will likely need to persuade Mr Newin and other party figures that the trade-off is worthwhile, the observers said.
